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To say that the histories and conceptual frameworks of Michel Foucault have, since the 
late 1980s, heavily influenced feminist theory is an understatement. On the other hand, 
one might add that the influence of Foucault on feminist jurisprudence and feminist legal 
theory has been much less pronounced, in spite of the obvious value of Foucault‟s work 
for critical legal theory more generally.
1
 One probable reason for this is the uncanny 
resemblance of Foucault‟s „sexless subject‟ to the abstract sexless subject of law which 
feminist legal theory has been tirelessly critiquing since its inception (giving rise to 
feminist works with titles such as: “unspeakable subjects”,2 “the hidden gender of law”,3 
“sexing the subject of law”,4 and so on).  
 
And yet, when a „new Foucault‟ – the Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben – hit 
the critical legal scene in the late nineties, one might argue that a new kind of feminist 
legal theory was quickly born; one that was receptive and subtly attentive to the work of 
both Foucault and Agamben. And this in spite of the fact that Agamben‟s legal subjects 
are, like Foucault‟s, utterly sexless. What might explain this phenomenon? Here, we 
suggest that Agamben‟s work on law and citizenship, in focusing exclusively on 
Foucault‟s concept of biopolitics, and therefore on questions of the regulation of 
populations rather than of individual bodies, represents a point of departure that is 
particularly „user friendly‟ for feminist legal theory. We would also argue that feminist 
legal scholars need not be disturbed by Agamben‟s apparent sex blindness – as earlier 
scholars were by the sex blindness of Foucault.    
 
While it is not possible, due to limits of space, to do justice to the full impact Agamben‟s 
work has had on Foucauldian scholarship, it seems important to mention here a particular 
dimension of his theoretical manner of working, which in some sense constitutes a thread 
running through all his works on political and legal theory, namely the idea of a “zone of 
indistinction”: the collapse of „inside‟ and „outside‟ into one another; the impossibility of 
speaking of social exclusion without at the same time speaking of an inclusion; one is 
included in order to be excluded. The zone of indistinction is an immediate effect of a 
regime of justice and rights in which all legal categories are derived from a politics 
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founded in biology. Such a regime, which Foucault named the biopolitical state, is 
primarily concerned with the questions of whether a being is alive or dead; whether it 
lives or dies; how long it can, or should live; in what manner it will die; how healthy it is 
in its state of life, and so on.  
 
The reduction of all living beings to biological organisms under biopolitical regimes 
(which, for Foucault and Aagmben, refers to all the populations of modern states – with 
the late eighteenth century as the key moment of historical transformation) accompanies 
the collapse of “traditional political distinctions … such as those between Right and Left, 
liberalism and totalitarianism, private and public”.5 That is the meaning of the zone of 
indistinction: the impossibility of distinguishing the supposedly legally protected citizen 
from politically vulnerable “bare life”. Bare life is the term Agamben uses to denote life 
that may be killed or preserved arbitrarily, developed from Agamben‟s revisionist work 





It is not difficult to imagine ways in which Agamben‟s framework, which does not 
recognize the legal categories of public and private, might speak to feminist legal 
perspectives, which dismantled these artificial distinctions of liberal political theory years 
ago.
7
 But it is not the collapsed binaries per se which have attracted feminist scholars to 
his work, but rather his particular collapse of the political category of the citizen into the 
biological category of “bare life”. This category has invited feminist theorists to ponder 
the gender implications of a political theory of law that sees politics as the reduction of 
all citizens to their „bare‟ biological functions (what Foucault referred to as “the 
bestialization of man”8). In a recent edited collection of essays entitled The Agamben 
Effect,
9
 Penelope Deutscher asks the critical question: “is it possible to open a debate 
with Giorgio Agamben concerning the role of women‟s bodies in the politicization of 
life? What different inflections of life and of politicized life would result from an 
intermittent insertion „born of women‟s bodies‟?”10 As one might expect, Deutscher‟s 
engagement with Agamben is in part intended as a corrective to a male theory that is 
blatantly indifferent to gender difference, and indeed other bodily markers of difference. 
She writes: “women‟s bodies are impressively absent from Agamben‟s writing, as are 
reproductive bodies”.11 Elsewhere, she points out that when Agamben speaks of “life”, he 
means that which has been first identified as human “and then stripped of that status or 
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subjected to a threshold state: the overcomatose person,
12
 the immigrant, the refugee, the 
internee, the enemy combatant, the Muselmann”.13 This makes it hard to insert into the 
theory forms of life that have never been accorded the status of the human in the first 
instance: the fetus, for example, and indeed the reproductive life of woman herself as 
womb-owning bearer of the fetus. Life, in an Agambenesque world, according to 
Deutscher, is life dissociated entirely from women‟s reproductivity. Yet, it is perhaps this 
very dissociation of woman from the theory that strikes Deutscher as the key to its 
potential for feminist theory; an “intriguing potential”, she writes, “to operate as a lens to 
rethink the terms life, bare life, threshold, and biopolitics”.14 
 
If we were to intervene in order to reformulate Deutscher‟s hypothesis regarding the 
“potential” in Agamben‟s work for feminist theory, it would be as follows: woman is 
absent from the theory insofar as the body of „woman‟ (by which we mean „reproductive 
woman‟) is already assumed as a key political referent. The theory, as it stands, sex blind 
as it is, is committed to an analysis of bodies in relation to the legal thresholds between 
“life and death, animate and inanimate, human and inhuman, nature and culture”.15 It 
therefore begs for an analysis of human bodies in relation to reproduction, and as 
mechanisms for reproduction. „Human life‟, in such an analysis, and with it „human 
rights‟ and the ethical foundations of citizenship in any given biopolitical state, must 
inevitably turn to a set of political and legislative questions around reproduction, 
reproductive rights (especially abortion), sexuality, and the family. In short, biopolitical 
theory cannot avoid making the female body central to its analysis of human life as an 
undefined essence both protected and unprotected by law.  
 
Against this (our) argument, Deutscher might justifiably reply, as indeed she makes clear 
in her essay, that Agamben‟s analysis, while enabling a legal analysis that occupies a 
“ghostly proximity” to feminist analysis, nevertheless contains a „non accidental‟ sex 
blindness, which fails in its feminism, just as sex blind legal and political theory has 
always failed in its feminism.
16
 Consider, then, the groundbreaking legal history by Ruth 
Miller, entitled The Limits of Bodily Integrity.
17
 Miller proceeds from a theoretical insight 
informed directly by Foucault and Agamben:  
 
Contemporary jurisprudence has not been a simple by-product of, but has been aimed precisely at 
constructing, [a] biologically/sexually passive, politically active sovereign subject … Defined first 
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and foremost as a biological (sexual and reproductive) criminal in need of regulation, this citizen 




The bracketed “(and as)” is crucial here. What we are to understand from Miller‟s 
analysis is that contemporary jurisprudence in modern times has been dedicated to the 
legal construction of a subject that not only occupies political space as a biological, 
reproductive animal, but which is biopolitical space – which for Miller means the womb. 
The womb, and by logical extension, the womb-owner is, in Miller‟s analysis, the 
paradigmatic citizen (or what she calls “the neutral citizen”) of the modern biopolitical 
state. She writes, and we quote this highly important passage at length by way of 
conclusion, 
 
For the most part a legal fantasy, [the] neutral citizen is rational and politically inviolate, operates 
faultlessly in the public sphere, and exercises right or performs duties under the aegis of a 
classical-juridical social contract. As a matter of course this citizen is also male. … 
 
[T]hese interpretations of the political neutral … hold only if we assume that classical juridical 
theory has indeed served as a model for sovereign relations over the past 200 years – if we assume 
that modern nation states have in fact been operating cording to a liberal social contract. If, 
however, we assume that the predominant model of sovereignty has been biopolitical, that the 
fundamental sovereign right has been the right to make live and let die – if we place sexual and 
reproductive legislation at the center of citizenship formation, and understand political activity as 
biological passivity – then we need to rethink this analysis … Rather than understanding men as 
the norm and women as artificial facsimiles of men, it makes far more sense in a biopolitical 
framework to understand women as the norm and men as their copies. It is the womb that has 
become the predominant biopolitical space, it is women‟s bodily borders that have been displaced 
onto national ones, [and] it is thus the citizen with the womb who has become he political neutral 
– and rather than grudgingly granting women the artificial phalluses assumed by liberal theory, 
one can in fact advance an argument that men instead have been granted the artificial wombs 
assumed by its biopolitical counterpart.
19
    
  
 
Earlier, we suggested that although Agamben‟s theory seems to neglect questions of 
sexual difference, sex blindness here might be immaterial from a feminist perspective, 
insofar as Agamben‟s biopolitical conceptual framework, which works with a particular 
biological conception of legal citizenship, inevitably and logically proceeds to the 
reproductive body of woman as a key political referent (by virtue of the dichotomies it 
interrogates and collapses, such as life/death, animate/inanimate, human/inhuman, 
nature/culture, etc). In Miller, this point is made using a biopolitical framework derived 
from Foucault and Agamben to argue that the modern biopolitical state automatically 
places biological reproduction at the center of what it means to be a political citizen. Her 
thesis uses Agamben‟s theoretical framework to illustrate the paradigmatic status of the 
female citizen (as womb owner), rather than correcting his framework for its lack of 
attention to bodily markers of sexual difference. In fact, Miller even goes as far as to 
critique feminist political theory for a kind of sex blindness; one which assumes that the 
neutral citizen is male, thereby confusing liberal political fantasy with biopolitical reality.  
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Is it possible that an „Agamben effect‟ in critical legal theory is facilitating a new 
understanding of citizenship, according to which it is the female reproductive body which 
represents the universal (paradigmatic) subject of law? As such, feminist legal theory 
might usefully serve as a tool for analysing the “relentless inclusion” of women in the 
biopolitical state.
 20
 This also would suggest that feminist legal theory is becoming 
paradigmatic of all critical legal theory in just the same the way as the female 
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